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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Defendants/Appellants Linette Perez ("Perez"), Juancho 
Alcantera ("Alcantera"), and Edmundo Batoon ("Batoon") 
appeal their convictions on the charge of conspiracy to 
distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 
methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in 
the District of New Jersey and elsewhere in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 846 and S 841(a)(1). All three were convicted by a 
jury in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. In this appeal, Appellants challenge their 
convictions on numerous grounds, one of which is a 
question of first impression for this Court -- whether and 
under what circumstances the trial court must give a jury 
instruction on venue. Appellants Alcantera and Batoon also 
challenge the District Court's ruling on a minor role 
reduction, and the attributable drug quantity, at 
sentencing. We affirm the convictions and sentences of 
each Appellant. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
In the following recitation of the facts on which 
Appellants' convictions were based, we construe those facts 
in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must 
following the jury's guilty verdict. Glasser v. United States, 
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Beginning in 1998, agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement 
Agency based in New Jersey opened an investigation into 
drug operations allegedly headed up by Lirio Del Rosario 
("Del Rosario") based on information supplied by a 
confidential source. With Del Rosario at the helm, the 
organization imported and distributed crystal 
methamphetamine in New York and New Jersey. 
 
The factual scenario leading up to and encompassing the 
arrest of Appellants unfolds as follows. In January of 1999, 
Del Rosario's supply of methamphetamine ran low. He 
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dispatched Alcantera and another man to the home of 
Augustin Daluro ("Daluro") in Jersey City, New Jersey to 
procure more of the drug. Daluro gave twenty grams of 
methamphetamine to Alcantera, without charge, for delivery 
to Del Rosario. At that time, Del Rosario told Daluro that he 
was getting travel documents for a woman named "Linette" 
so that she could smuggle methamphetamine into the 
United States as part of his operation. 
 
In early February of 1999, members of the Queens 
Narcotics Division of the New York City Police Department 
("N.Y.P.D.") received information of Del Rosario's drug 
operation from another confidential informant (CI-1), and 
began an independent investigation. When the federal and 
local investigators learned that they were conducting 
parallel investigations, they agreed to pool their 
information. The confidential informants tipped off the 
federal and N.Y.P.D. investigators that a woman named 
"Linette" would be bringing in a large shipment of 
methamphetamine through John F. Kennedy Airport on 
February 24, 1999. The informant offered a description of 
"Linette," which was later confirmed by several customs 
agents. 
 
On February 18, 1999, Perez, who at the time was a 
United States citizen living in Virginia, obtained a passport. 
The following day, she purchased a round-trip ticket from 
J.F.K. Airport to Manila, the Philippines, through a New 
York City travel agency. Perez departed from the United 
States on February 22, 1999, and checked into the Manila 
Holiday Inn where she stayed for two days. While in Manila, 
Perez obtained ten kilograms of crystal methamphetamine 
from relatives of Del Rosario. The methamphetamine was 
put into plastic baggies, hidden inside fabric shoulder pads 
of women's dresses, and placed into two large cardboard 
boxes. 
 
On February 23, 1999, while Perez was still in Manila, 
Del Rosario called Prajedo Almiranez ("Almiranez") and 
asked him to pick up Perez when she arrived at J.F.K. 
Airport, but he was unable to go. On February 24, 1999, 
Del Rosario called Nestor Uy ("Uy"), a Filipino living in New 
York City who occasionally repaired automobiles for Del 
Rosario, and asked him to pick up Perez. Uy had met Perez 
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before at Del Rosario's home. Del Rosario told Uy that Perez 
would be arriving at J.F.K. Airport on Asianna Airlines, and 
gave Uy money to pay the excess baggage fee for the 
packages Perez was bringing in from the Philippines, for a 
hotel room for Perez at the Queens Motor Inn, and for gas 
and food. 
 
Perez returned to the United States that evening with the 
two large boxes, arriving at J.F.K. Airport at approximately 
8:35 p.m. Uy arrived late to J.F.K. Airport, and was unable 
to find Perez. He called the number for Alcantera's cell 
phone several times and spoke to Del Rosario, who told him 
to keep looking for Perez. At the same time, several N.Y.P.D. 
investigators also went to J.F.K. Airport with CI-1 to 
intercept Perez, but they were unable to locate her. 
 
Finally, Uy discovered that Perez had taken a cab to Del 
Rosario's home. Uy went to the Queens Motor Inn and 
reserved a room for Perez under his name, then went to Del 
Rosario's apartment to pick up Perez. In Del Rosario's living 
room were the two large boxes. Uy then drove Perez back to 
the hotel. During the trip, Perez told Uy that she had just 
smuggled ten kilos of methamphetamine into the United 
States from Del Rosario's family in the Philippines, boasting 
that she "had the guts to do that." Uy stayed with Perez at 
the hotel briefly, then drove her to Batoon's home in 
Elmhurst, Queens. 
 
At around 10:00 a.m. the next morning, February 25th, 
Almiranez picked up Perez from Batoon's home and drove 
her to Del Rosario's apartment. Uy arrived at the apartment 
at approximately 11:00 a.m. He saw that the boxes had 
been opened, the plastic bags removed from the shoulder 
pads of the dresses and cut open, and the 
methamphetamine taken out. Del Rosario explained to Uy 
how the methamphetamine had been packaged and how 
Asianna Airlines and the customs officials protected Del 
Rosario's drug shipments. 
 
Del Rosario then called Arturo Zoletta, who had 
previously delivered methamphetamine for him. Del Rosario 
told Zoletta that he had a shipment of methamphetamine 
for him to deliver to another person. Zoletta paged Roland 
Abaia, a cab driver, to pick him up at his home. The two 
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drove to Del Rosario's apartment in Abaia's Lincoln 
Towncar. 
 
At approximately 2:00 that afternoon, acting on a tip 
from CI-1 that Del Rosario was dealing methamphetamine 
out of three possible locations, plain-clothed investigators 
and uniformed officers from the N.Y.P.D. staked out Del 
Rosario's apartment building, an automobile body shop, 
and Uy's residence, all in Queens. 
 
Del Rosario's apartment building was four stories high, 
with four apartment units on each floor. The N.Y.P.D. 
officers knew from the informant that Del Rosario's 
apartment was 2C. It was located at the back of the second 
floor, and one could not see the street from the inside. Nor 
could the surveilling officers tell which apartment was Del 
Rosario's from the outside of the building. They observed 
several cars stop outside of Del Rosario's apartment 
building, stay for a few minutes, then leave. Just before 
6:00 p.m., the investigators observed Abaia drive up to Del 
Rosario's apartment building in the Lincoln Towncar with 
Zoletta in the back seat. Zoletta got out of the car and 
entered the building empty-handed while Abaia waited 
outside. 
 
Zoletta emerged from the apartment building 
approximately ten minutes later, carrying a clear plastic 
bag with a white plastic bag inside of it. He got back into 
the Lincoln Towncar, and showed the bag to Abaia. The two 
drove off, followed by two of the plain-clothed police 
investigators driving an unmarked police car. Zoletta 
turned around and made eye contact with one of the 
investigators. The investigators observed Zoletta lean over, 
apparently to stuff the bag under the front seat. After 
Zoletta and Abaia had driven two blocks and turned the 
corner, the investigators pulled them over. 
 
The investigators saw the clear bag with a white shopping 
bag inside. In the white bag, the investigators found what 
appeared to be approximately 200 grams of 
methamphetamine, and they placed Abaia and Zoletta 
under arrest. A search of the car uncovered more drugs 
and drug paraphernalia, including a small gram-weight 
scale, pipes used for smoking methamphetamine, ziplock 
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bags, a cell phone, and a pager. At this point, Zoletta 
cooperated with the investigators, telling them that he had 
worked for Del Rosario delivering methamphetamine for two 
years in New York City and New Jersey. Zoletta told the 
investigators that he had just been in Del Rosario's 
apartment, Unit 2C, and that Del Rosario had just given 
him a package of drugs to deliver. Zoletta told the 
investigators that there were several people still in the 
apartment. 
 
The interchange lasted only a few minutes, after which 
the officers decided to get a search warrant. However, 
apparently fearing that their arrest of Zoletta would tip off 
the occupants in the apartment to destroy the drugs, the 
officers decided to forego getting the warrant. Instead, the 
investigators returned to the apartment building and with 
the uniformed officers went up to Del Rosario's apartment. 
They knocked, and when a woman answered, the 
uniformed officers stated that they had received a 
disturbance call and asked if they could come in to see if 
everyone was all right. The woman, Perez, let them into the 
apartment. 
 
Upon entering, the officers encountered Del Rosario, 
Perez, Alcantera, Batoon, and Almiranez inside. A bag of 
approximately 100 grams of crystal methamphetamine was 
in plain view on top of the television in the living room. The 
officers placed all of the occupants of the apartment under 
arrest and conducted a protective sweep to secure the 
premises and to assure their safety. Perez told the officers 
that she had just returned from the Philippines and was 
staying at the Queens Motor Inn. She gave her consent to 
search the hotel room and handed the officers the key. At 
this point, two of the officers left with Zoletta to obtain 
search warrants for Del Rosario's apartment and Perez's 
hotel room. 
 
The officers completed the warrant affidavit with the 
assistance of the Queens County District Attorney's office. 
They included in the warrant reference to what was seen at 
the apartment. However, due to the unavailability of judges 
at the late hour, the officers had to travel to Manhattan to 
obtain judicial review of the warrant application. 
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Meanwhile, back at the apartment, Daluro arrived with a 
suitcase containing $67,500. The officers present placed 
him under arrest and seized the suitcase. 
 
At approximately 4:00 the next morning (February 26), 
the officers who went for the search warrant returned to 
Del Rosario's apartment with the warrant and began to 
conduct a search. In the course of the search, they 
discovered approximately four kilograms of crystal 
methamphetamine, over $28,000 in cash belonging to Del 
Rosario, hand-written records of drug transactions, 
numerous plastic ziplock bags in five different sizes, several 
BB rifles and pistols, three cell phones, a pager, a 
combination cell phone and two-way radio, and a 
bulletproof vest. 
 
From Perez the officers seized $724, her passport, a 
Virginia driver's license, and two credit cards. From her 
hotel room, they seized the written itinerary for her recent 
trip to Manila and credit card receipts from her stay there. 
From Almiranez the officers took into custody three plastic 
bags and a cigarette box containing 116 grams of crystal 
methamphetamine. They captured from Alcantera a cell 
phone with a battery and a pager. From Batoon they took 
hold of a small amount of methamphetamine consistent 
with personal use and a pager. 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
On March 1, 1999, a federal grand jury issued a one- 
count indictment charging Appellants and five co-defendants1 
with violating 21 U.S.C. S 846 by conspiring to distribute 
and to possess with intent to distribute more than one 
kilogram of methamphetamine in the District of New Jersey 
and elsewhere, contrary to 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). Several of 
the defendants filed motions to suppress the physical 
evidence seized by the police. On August 18, 1999, the 
District Court conducted a hearing on the motions to 
suppress, and on September 10, 1999, the District Court 




1. The indictment charged Appellants Perez, Alcantera, and Batoon, as 
well as Lirio Del Rosario, Augustin Daluro, Roland Abaia, Prajedo 
Almiranez, and Arturo Zoletta. 
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On August 16, 1999, prior to the District Court's ruling 
on the suppression motions, Daluro pled guilty to the 
indictment pursuant to a cooperation and plea agreement 
with the Government. On October 20, 1999, Del Rosario 
pled guilty to the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement 
that did not require his cooperation with the Government. 
On the same day, Zoletta and Almiranez also pled guilty to 
the indictment pursuant to cooperation agreements with 
the Government. 
 
The remaining defendants -- Perez, Alcantera, Batoon, 
and Abaia -- were tried jointly on the charge in the 
indictment. At trial, Daluro,2 Zoletta, Almiranez,3 and Uy,4 
an unindicted co-conspirator, all testified on behalf of the 
Government. Alcantera was the only defendant to testify. In 
its motion for acquittal at the close of the Government's 
case, the defense made a general application claiming that 
the Government did not produce credible evidence to 
sustain a conviction. The motion did not specifically raise 
venue as a disputed issue, i.e., whether the trial should 
have occurred in the District of New Jersey. The District 
Court denied the motion, responding: "The Court 
determines that there is indeed . . . sufficient evidence for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Daluro testified that he distributed methamphetamine for Del Rosario 
in New Jersey and traveled to Del Rosario's apartment in New York to 
pick up the drugs. He frequently saw Almiranez, who also lived in Jersey 
City, New Jersey, with Del Rosario. Daluro testified further that he 
occasionally encountered Batoon in Del Rosario's apartment when he 
went there to pick up drugs, and that Del Rosario typically had a lot of 
methamphetamine in his apartment. Daluro also testified that Alcantera 
had been to his residence in Jersey City, New Jersey in late January 
1999 to buy drugs for Del Rosario. 
 
3. Almiranez testified that he sold the methamphetamine he obtained 
from Del Rosario to others to resell in Jersey City, New Jersey. Almiranez 
also testified that in 1998 he observed Del Rosario give between 10 and 
100 grams of methamphetamine to Appellants Batoon and Alcantera in 
each of their respective homes. 
 
4. Uy testified that in the Fall of 1998, while in Del Rosario's 
apartment, 
he saw Del Rosario give drugs to Batoon in exchange for a "wad" of what 
appeared to be twenty dollar bills. Uy testified further that in March 
1999, while the two were incarcerated in Queens House, a men's 
detention center in Queens, Alcantera boasted to him that he was one of 
Del Rosario's sellers. 
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the jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt both the 
existence of the conspiracy charged in the indictment and 
the participation and membership of each of the defendants 
on trial in that conspiracy." At the jury charge conference 
and following the charge, the defendants requested that the 
District Court instruct the jury on venue. The District 
Court denied this request. 
 
On November 11, 1999, the jury returned guilty verdicts 
against Perez, Alcantera, and Batoon, and acquitted Abaia. 
Appellants moved for a new trial, arguing that the District 
Court should have submitted the question of venue to the 
jury. The District Court denied this motion, but cautioned: 
 
       If indeed I am wrong and the law to be applied to this 
       case is such that this was a matter that should have 
       been submitted to the jury upon a defense request, 
       upon submission of the jury instructions, then I would 
       not conclude the Court's decision to do otherwise is 
       harmless error. I think the evidence, in other words, as 
       to the presence of venue in the District of New Jersey 
       is not so overwhelming that the jury couldn't have 
       decided otherwise had it been before it. 
 
The District Court conducted sentencing hearings in 
March 2000, and imposed sentences at or near the bottom 
of the applicable Sentencing Guideline ranges for each 
defendant.5 The Appellants filed timely appeals, which are 
consolidated before us. We have jurisdiction to hear their 
appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. Failure to Instruct the Jury on Venue 
 
Appellants claim that the District Court erred when it 
failed to instruct the jury whether the District of New 
Jersey was the proper venue for their trial, as was alleged 
in the indictment. As set out above, the crimes alleged with 
respect to Appellants appear on their face to have occurred 
primarily within New York City. The Government's evidence 
tying the conspiracy to New Jersey consisted of the 
testimony of Uy, an unindicted co-conspirator, and of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The District Court sentenced Perez to a term of imprisonment of 235 
months. It sentenced Alcantera to 190 months, and Batoon to 152. 
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Daluro, Zoletta, and Almiranez, all of whom pled guilty, 
that they conducted their part of the drug operation in New 
York and New Jersey and encountered Appellants Alcantera 
and Batoon buying drugs from and for Del Rosario. 
 
We hold that, where the indictment alleges venue without 
a facially obvious defect, the failure to instruct the jury to 
determine whether that venue is proper is reversible error 
only when (1) the defendant objects to venue prior to or at 
the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, (2) there is a 
genuine issue of material fact with regard to proper venue, 
and (3) the defendant timely requests a jury instruction. 
Because the first and second prerequisites were unmet 
here, the District Court did not err in failing to instruct the 
jury on venue. Our reasoning for this rule and our 
conclusion in this case are discussed below. 
 
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right 
to be tried in the district in which the crime was 
committed. Proper venue is a safeguard that is guaranteed 
twice in the Constitution. Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 3 
declares that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; 
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said 
Crimes shall have been committed . . . ." U.S. Const. art. 
III, S 2, c. 3. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 
provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law."6 U.S. Const. amend. VI; see 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The framers, explained Justice Frankfurter in United States v. 
Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944), wrote the first of these provisions 
into the Constitution because they were "[a]ware of the unfairness and 
hardship to which trial in an environment alien to the accused exposes 
him . . . ." The second provision, providing the"State and district" from 
which the jury is to be drawn, serves as a reinforcement to the first 
"[a]s 
though to underscore the importance of this safeguard." Id. 
 
The provision in Article III is literally a venue provision because it 
fixes 
the place of trial, whereas the Sixth Amendment is a vicinage guarantee 
because it determines from where the jurors in a criminal trial shall be 
selected. "This distinction, however, has never been given any weight, 
perhaps because it is unlikely that jurors from one district would be 
asked to serve at a trial in another district, or perhaps, more 
importantly, because the requirement . . . presupposes that the jury will 
sit where it is chosen." United States v. Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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United States v. Baxter, 884 F.2d 734, 736 (3d Cir. 1989). 
The Government has the burden of proving that venue is 
proper. United States v. Black Cloud, 590 F.2d 270, 272 
(8th Cir. 1979). 
 
In 1944, Congress embedded the constitutional venue 
guarantee in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 
18 states that "[e]xcept as otherwise permitted by statute or 
by these rules, the prosecution shall be had in a district in 
which the offense was committed. . . ." That same year, the 
United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case United 
States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944), underscored the 
importance of safeguarding the constitutional guarantee of 
proper venue in criminal trials. 
 
       These are matters that touch closely the fair 
       administration of criminal justice and public 
       confidence in it, on which it ultimately rests. These are 
       important factors in any consideration of the effective 
       enforcement of the criminal law. . . . Questions of 
       venue in criminal cases, therefore, are not merely 
       matters of formal legal procedure. They raise deep 
       issues of public policy in the light of which legislation 
       must be construed. 
 
Johnson, 323 U.S. at 276. 
 
Despite its basis in the Constitution, venue in the 
criminal context continues to occupy a lesser station in the 
hierarchy of constitutionally-derived rights. The issue of 
proper venue in a criminal proceeding can be waived by a 
defendant. See United States v. Turley, 891 F.2d 57, 63 (3d 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Sandini, 803 F.2d 123, 127 (3d 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Moody v. United States, 
479 U.S. 1093 (1987). Further, the standard for finding a 
waiver of venue is less rigorous than that for finding a 
waiver of the rights to trial by jury, to confront one's 
accusers and to be free from self-incrimination. See Boykin 
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Sandini, 803 F.2d at 127. 
In Sandini, we observed that "[o]bjections to venue are 
waived if not raised in a timely manner." What is timely 
depends on whether the alleged error is clear from the 
indictment. Where an indictment alleges venue on its face 
without an obvious defect, "the defendant has no notice 
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that a facially proper allegation of venue is in fact defective, 
and thus there can be no waiver until the close of the 
government's case." Id. 
 
Under Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Congress has the power to lay out the elements 
of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the 
districts in which the crucial elements are performed. See 
United States v. Flaxman, 304 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) (referencing Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 
(1961)). Pursuant to this power, Congress has modified the 
venue safeguards by statute to fit the situation of 
conspiracy. "[A]ny offense . . . begun in one district and 
completed in another, or committed in more than one 
district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district 
in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." 
18 U.S.C. S 3237(a). 
 
In addition, venue can be established wherever a co- 
conspirator has committed an act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
 
       We see no reason why a constructive presence should 
       not be assigned to conspirators as well as to other 
       criminals; and we certainly cannot assent to the 
       proposition that it is not competent for Congress to 
       define what shall constitute the offense of conspiracy 
       or when it shall be considered complete, and do with it 
       as with other crimes which are commenced in one 
       place and continued in another. 
 
Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1912); see 
also United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 
2000) (stating the traditional rule that a conspiracy charge 
may be tried in any district in which an overt act of 
conspiracy occurred); United States v. Dabbs, 134 F.3d 
1071, 1078 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that in a conspiracy 
case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed 
or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of 
the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators); 
U.S. v. Bascope-Zurita, 68 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(same); United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 
1995) (same); United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1366 
(10th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 
                                13 
  
It is against this backdrop that we consider the 
Appellants' assertion that the District Court committed 
reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on venue, 
both after a request by defendants at the charge conference 
and following the charge. The specific issue raised by 
Appellants is whether proof of venue in a multi-district 
indictment for conspiracy is a determination of fact that 
must be submitted to a properly instructed jury upon 
defendants' request. This precise question has not been 
considered by this Court, although several other courts of 
appeal have formulated varying rules governing when a trial 
court must instruct the jury on venue. To resolve this 
issue, we must make the threshold determinations of 
whether venue is an element of an offense and, if so, 
whether it presents a factual or legal question. 
 
A. Is Venue an Element of an Offense? 
 
Federal courts of appeals often state that venue is an 
element of every offense. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 
111 F.3d 747 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Winship, 
724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
White, 611 F.2d 531, 536 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
992 (1980); but compare United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 
922 F.2d 934, 969 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendants' 
attempt to challenge venue based on supposed omission in 
the counts with which they had been charged and stating 
that "[v]enue, however, is not an element of the offense"). In 
general, "[t]he Constitution gives a criminal defendant the 
right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is 
charged." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 
(1995). 
 
Further inquiry, however, reveals that the term"element" 
lacks its usual force in the context of venue. What the 
courts give criminal defendants on this issue with one hand 
they frequently take away with the other. When courts 
describe venue as an element, they often distinguish it from 
"substantive" or "essential" elements. See United States v. 
Kaytso, 868 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1988); United States 
v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1987); Miller, 111 
F.3d at 749; Wilkett v. United States, 655 F.2d 1007, 1011 
(10th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit has explained that while 
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venue is an element, it will be protected less vigorously 
than other elements. See Winship, 724 F.2d at 1124. 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that while one 
may call venue an element, "it is an element more akin to 
jurisdiction than to the substantive elements of the crime." 
United States v. Massa, 686 F.2d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(citing White, 611 F.2d at 536). Put another way, "[v]enue is 
wholly neutral; it is a question of procedure, more than 
anything else, and it does not either prove or disprove the 
guilt of the accused." Wilkett, 655 F.2d at 1011. 
 
In keeping with venue's Boswellian status as a criminal 
element, courts require a lesser standard of proof than with 
regard to the other elements of an offense -- a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a 
reasonable doubt.7 See, e.g., United States v. Barsanti, 943 
F.2d 428 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1991); 
United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1054-55 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014 (1991); United States v. 
Taylor, 828 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1987); Winship, 724 F.2d at 
1124; United States v. Males, 715 F.2d 568 (11th Cir. 
1983); Massa, 686 F.2d at 531; United States v. Davis, 666 
F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Haley , 500 F.2d 
302, 305 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Powell, 498 F.2d 
890 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866 (1974); 2 Charles 
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 307 (3d ed. 2000). Our Court now explicitly 
joins those courts in adopting the preponderance standard 
for venue, a question which we reserved in United States v. 
Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 n.4 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
We agree with the Seventh Circuit that venue is"an 
element more akin to jurisdiction than to the substantive 
elements of the crime." Massa, 686 F.2d at 530; White, 611 
F.2d at 536. In this context, although an element strictly 
speaking, venue does not automatically present a question 
for the jury. We deal below with when it does. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court in Gaudin 
did not have occasion to address the proper treatment of a 
nonsubstantive element like venue. Miller, 111 F.3d at 749-50 (citing 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509 n.1). 
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B. When Must a Jury Instruction on Venue Be Given? 
 
Appellants contend that whether venue is proper is 
always an issue of fact for the jury to decide. The 
Government, however, argues that where venue is not 
disputed at trial, the court may properly find it as a matter 
of law without submitting the issue to the jury. This is so, 
it argues, even if venue might have been in genuine dispute 
had it been raised at trial.8 We considered this fact versus 
law distinction in Passodelis and held that"the question of 
venue at issue here is a matter of law." 615 F.2d at 978. 
The defendant in Passodelis was convicted of violating 
federal law by making contributions to then-Governor 
Milton Shapp's presidential campaign in excess of the 
campaign limit and in the name of another person. There 
was no dispute that Governor Shapp's campaign 
headquarters were located in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania and that contributions were deposited there. 
Proper venue turned on the question of "whether there 
[was] evidence in the record which will support a finding 
that acts which constitute elements of the crimes were 
committed by Passodelis in the Middle District." Id. We 
ruled that the Government did not provide sufficient 
evidence to meet its burden of establishing that venue was 
proper. Id. The majority opinion distinguished the dissent, 
which argued that venue in that case was "wholly factual 
[in] nature," id. at 979, as follows: 
 
       The dissent is certainly correct in characterizing the 
       central issue in dispute in this case as a factual one. 
       However, we are concerned that the dissent 
       misapprehends the nature of our inquiry. The dissent 
       asserts that we substitute our own "verdict of 
       acquittal." However, we are not reviewing whether there 
       was sufficient evidence upon which a jury could have 
       found Passodelis guilty, but rather whether there was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The only Supreme Court case addressing the fact versus law 
distinction with respect to venue dates to 1861. In United States v. 
Jackalow, 66 U.S. 484 (1861), the Supreme Court ruled that for 
purposes of determining whether venue existed in one district for a 
piracy conviction, the existence of a border dispute between states, 
affecting the determination of where the acts actually occurred, did not 
provide a basis to conclude that those acts occurred within that district. 
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       sufficient evidence upon which the district court could 
       have found that crimes were committed by Passodelis 
       in the Middle District. In fact, it is completely 
       unnecessary for us to call into question any of the 
       jury's findings since there is no factual inconsistency 
       between the jury having found that Passodelis 
       committed the crimes for which he was convicted and 
       our determination that the evidence was insufficient to 
       support a finding that crimes were committed by 
       Passodelis in the Middle District. The two inquiries are, 
       on the facts of this case, entirely separate. . . . 
       [Moreover,] the determination as to whether there was 
       sufficient evidence to support a finding that crimes were 
       committed by Passodelis in the Middle District is a 
       question of law, not of fact. 
 
Id. at 978 n.6 (emphasis added).9  
 
Nine years later, in United States v. Baxter, we repeated 
substantially the underscored language from Passodelis in 
concluding that "the question of venue at issue here is a 
matter of law. . . ." 884 F.2d 734, 736 (3d Cir. 1989). In 
Baxter, the defendant was convicted of five counts of 
receiving an illegal gratuity while a public official. It was not 
disputed that Baxter received the illegal payments (by way 
of checks drawn on a bank account in Pennsylvania, 
deposited in his bank in Arlington, Virginia), at his home in 
Reston, Virginia, and that the checks were presented for 
payment by the Virginia bank at the bank in Jenkintown, 
Pennsylvania. Id. Permissible venue turned on the legal 
question of whether this scenario constituted a continuing 
offense such that prosecution was proper either in the 
applicable district where the checks were deposited 
(Virginia) or where the checks were paid (Pennsylvania). 
Considering the individualized acts of the defendant and 
the continuing nature of the offense, we concluded that 
venue was proper. Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We did not decide, however, the standard of proof (beyond reasonable 
doubt or preponderance of the evidence) for determining venue because 
"under either standard . . . the government has not met the burden." Id. 
at 978 n.4. 
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We continued the theme that, at least initially, the 
"district court's decision regarding proper venue was an 
interpretation of law . . ." in United States v. Palma- 
Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841 (3d Cir. 1997), reversed on other 
grounds sub nom. United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno , 526 
U.S. 275 (1999). The venue question in Palma-Ruedas was 
whether "the government [can] try a defendant for using or 
carrying a firearm in any venue where it may try the related 
crime when the defendant neither carried nor used the 
firearm in that venue." Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 848. It 
was undisputed that the defendant only carried or used the 
firearm in Maryland. Deciding the legal question, we 
determined that venue in New Jersey was improper. Id. at 
850-51. 
 
Turning to this case, the District Court, in ruling on the 
venue issue raised by the defense for the first time at the 
jury charge conference, relied on our declarations in Baxter 
and Palma-Ruedas that venue was a matter of law. In 
discussing these cases, the District Court noted orally: 
 
        [T]he determination of criminal venue is a matter for 
       the court, is a matter of law, and not for the jury as a 
       matter of fact. 
 
        So with that reaffirmation of the strength of the 
       Baxter rule, although in a slightly different context, 
       this Court determines that it will not instruct the jury 
       on the question of venue. Furthermore, the Court 
       determines at this juncture that there is certainly 
       sufficient evidence of proper venue in this district with 
       regard to all of the defendants. So that if faced with a 
       motion at this juncture to dismiss the case for lack of 
       proper venue, that motion would be denied. 
 
We take issue with the District Court's reading of our line 
of venue decisions to the extent that it concludes that 
venue can never pose an issue of fact that should be 
submitted to a jury. The trial judge is the gatekeeper at 
trial, and in so acting determines as a matter of law 
whether there are sufficiently disputed issues of material 
fact to be decided by the jury. In Passodelis , we were able 
to rule as a matter of law because we were reviewing the 
legal question of "whether there was sufficient evidence 
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upon which the district court could have found that crimes 
were committed . . . in the . . . District." Passodelis, 615 
F.2d at 978 n.6 (emphasis added). In Baxter and Palma- 
Ruedas, we could rule as a matter of law because the 
necessary facts were established and only the legal 
question of how broadly we would define venue remained. 
Baxter, 884 F.2d at 736; Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 848. 
Thus, in Baxter, whether checks were presented for 
payment in Jenkintown, Pennsylvania would have been a 
factual inquiry affecting venue had it been in dispute, but 
it was not. Similarly, in Palma-Ruedas, whether the 
defendant carried a firearm in New Jersey would have 
raised a fact question affecting venue except that the 
Government conceded that the defendant had never done 
so. Instead it argued that venue in New Jersey was proper 
as a matter of law because the predicate offense of 
kidnapping had taken place in part in that state. 
 
In this case, the District Court found sufficient evidence 
existed to show as a matter of law that venue in New Jersey 
was suitable, i.e., congruent with some aspect of the 
conspiracy crime being committed in New Jersey. This was 
a proper determination for the Court to make.10 As noted 
below, the Government's evidence on the matter was 
sufficient to establish venue by a preponderance, and 
Appellants did not interpose evidence at trial to raise a 
material dispute over this issue such that it needed to be 
resolved by the jury. In this context, it was not unlike the 
undisputed threshold issues of fact in Baxter  and Palma- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Several Courts recognize that venue can be"a question of fact" that 
ordinarily must be decided by the jury. United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 
747, 749 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 
584 (10th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Record , 873 F.2d 1363, 1370 
(10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Black Cloud, 590 F.2d 270, 272 (8th Cir. 1979) 
("Whether the receipt of the firearm in question occurred in the District 
of North Dakota, so that venue in that district was proper, was a 
question of fact for the jury."); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 
856 
(5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Gillette, 189 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 
1951)). But this does not mean that every venue determination presents 
a jury question. For whether sufficient evidence exists to support a 
finding that crimes were committed in New Jersey is a question of law 
for the court. See Passodelis, 615 F.2d at 978 n.6. 
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Ruedas. Put another way, proper venue in a criminal case 
may pose a question of fact for the jury if venue is in issue 
and meets procedural trip points. 
 
When then is venue genuinely in issue, particularly in 
the context of conspiracy? This question has not been 
addressed directly by this Court, although in United States 
v. Turley, 891 F.2d 57, 60 (3d Cir. 1989), United States v. 
Sandini, 803 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1986), and United States v. 
Polin, 323 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1963), we addressed the 
broader question of when the failure to object to venue 
results in the defendant waiving the issue altogether. What 
we consider here is not simply when a defendant waives his 
right to challenge venue completely, but when venue 
presents a fact question for the jury as opposed to a 
question of law for the court. 
 
The precise issue of when venue is "in issue" so as to 
raise a fact question for the jury is one on which our sister 
courts of appeal differ. The more narrow view, followed by 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, holds that venue is not in 
issue unless it is actually disputed at trial. See Winship, 
724 F.2d at 11125-26; Massa, 686 F.2d at 529-31. But the 
Tenth Circuit holds that "failure to instruct[the jury] on 
venue, when requested, is reversible error unless it is 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's guilty verdict on 
the charged offense necessarily incorporates a finding of 
proper venue." Miller, 111 F.3d at 751. Straddling these 
opposing positions are the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, 
which hold, on the one hand, that venue is in issue 
whenever defendants might otherwise be convicted"of the 
offenses charged without an implicit finding that the acts 
used to establish venue had been proven," United States v. 
Martinez, 901 F.2d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 461 (8th Cir. 1985), which is the 
Tenth Circuit's position, but on the other hand have found 
harmless the refusal by the trial court to instruct on venue 
because evidence that criminal acts occurred in the 
applicable districts was substantial and uncontroverted. 
Martinez, 901 F.2d at 376-77; Moeckly, 769 F.2d at 462. 
 
In Massa, the Seventh Circuit adopted an"in issue" rule 
that looks to whether trial testimony established venue as 
a disputed issue of fact. It concluded that the trial court did 
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not err "in denying a specific venue instruction where the 
issue of venue was not disputed" at trial. 686 F.2d at 531. 
The trial court ruled that venue had been established as a 
matter of law based on (1) the sufficiency of the 
Government's proof that venue existed in the Northern 
District of Indiana as per the indictment, and (2) the fact 
that Massa did not contest venue by presenting any 
contrary evidence. Id. The Appeals Court affirmed and 
stated that "[w]here venue is not in issue, no court has ever 
held that a venue instruction must be given." Id. at 530. 
 
In Winship, the Fifth Circuit followed a harmless error 
analysis, though it nonetheless noted that trial testimony is 
a precondition to putting venue in issue. There the 
defendants were charged with, among other counts, 
conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute 
marijuana and methamphetamine in Texas, Oklahoma, and 
Louisiana. Although neither defendant was present in the 
Western District of Louisiana where venue was laid, the 
trial testimony of several indicted co-conspirators connected 
them with distribution activities in that district. Id. at 1120. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the trial 
testimony put venue genuinely in issue. It concluded that 
the uncontroverted evidence that the charged drug activity 
occurred in the Western District of Louisiana was so 
overwhelming that trial testimony did not put venue"in 
issue." Id. at 1125. Therefore, the trial court's failure to 
instruct the jury in that case was harmless error. The Fifth 
Circuit nonetheless admonished against the trial court's 
failure to give the venue instruction, noting that"the better 
procedure is to give the venue instruction when requested, 
regardless of whether the trial court believes trial testimony 
has put venue in issue." Id. at 1126 n.13. 
 
We find the approach to the "in issue" test formulated by 
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits to be more persuasive than 
the broader view taken (at least theoretically) by the Fourth, 
Eighth and Tenth Circuits. Venue cannot be in issue unless 
the parties actually dispute it. It is an element"more akin 
to jurisdiction than to the substantive elements of the 
crime." Massa, 686 F.2d at 530. Moreover, objections to 
venue are waived if not raised in a timely manner. Sandini, 
803 F.2d at 127. An issue that has been waived because no 
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one has objected to it should not at the same time be "in 
issue" so as to require a jury instruction. That paradoxical 
result, however, appears to be the upshot of a broad"in 
issue" rule. Moreover, the reality that the Fourth and 
Eighth Circuits have followed conclusions that venue was 
properly "in issue" with harmless error analyses affirming 
the decision not to submit the question to the jury 
demonstrates the efficiency of requiring parties to bear the 
consequences of their own inaction. 
 
We conclude that, where the indictment alleges venue 
without a facially obvious defect, if (1) the defendant objects 
to venue prior to or at the close of the prosecution's case- 
in-chief, (2) there is a genuine issue of material fact with 
regard to proper venue, and (3) the defendant timely 
requests a jury instruction, venue becomes a jury question 
and the court must specifically instruct the jury on venue.11 
These three requirements are separate. The purpose of 
objecting to venue prior to or at the close of the 
prosecution's case is to alert the prosecution to the issue 
and thereby avoid waiving it under Sandini and Polin. A 
defendant may object to venue by raising its absence in a 
pre-trial motion, challenging during the Government's case 
its evidence as to venue, or making a motion for acquittal 
at the close of the Government's case that specifically deals 
with venue. 
 
Even if a defendant properly objects to venue, however, it 
does not become a fact question for the jury unless the 
defendant also places it in issue by establishing a genuine 
issue of material fact with regard to venue. Trial testimony 




11. While we hold that the trial court was not required to give a venue 
instruction under the facts of this case, the better practice is to give 
the 
instruction when requested. This is especially the preferred course in 
this case, where the trial judge later offered that"the evidence . . . as 
to 
the presence of venue in the District of New Jersey is not so 
overwhelming that the jury couldn't have decided otherwise had it been 
before it." 
 
12. Our ruling that venue is in issue if the defendant does no more than 
introduce direct evidence during the defense presentation does not run 
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When either the time for a venue objection or the 
opportunities to establish the facts placing venue in issue 
pass unavailed, venue is waived even if a jury instruction is 
requested. Objecting to venue at the jury instruction phase, 
without more, is not sufficient, for it does not flag and 
establish an issue of fact that warrants a special jury 
instruction. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Massa, "where 
venue is not in issue, no court has ever held that a venue 
instruction must be given." 686 F.2d at 530. Furthermore, 
we agree with the Court in Massa that "where venue is not 
disputed and the Government presents sufficient evidence 
of venue . . . ", it is a matter "particularly suited to 
determination by the court as a matter of law." Id. at 531. 
Finally, as a procedural matter, a defendant who has both 
properly objected to venue and placed it in issue must also 
timely request a jury instruction on it. 
 
We now apply this rule to the facts of the case before us. 
Here we have an unchallenged indictment that alleges a 
conspiracy in New Jersey, buttressed by trial testimony of 
two alleged co-conspirators that overt acts in furtherance of 
the conspiracy occurred in New Jersey.13  No countervailing 
evidence was introduced by the Appellants nor did they at 
or before trial challenge the Government's case in any way. 
Instead, they now counter merely that the Government's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
afoul of the rule in Sandini, 803 F.2d at 127, that, where the indictment 
alleges facially valid venue, objections to venue are waived if not raised 
at or before the close of the Government's case. The timing cutoff of 
Sandini and Polin refers to when the defendant must object to venue. 
Having made a timely objection, the defendant normally needs to present 
testimony that places venue in issue at any time prior to the close of 
evidence. Alternatively, the court may find that the Government's 
testimony places venue in issue notwithstanding the defense 
presentation. 
 
13. This begs the question of what happens if the Government previously 
alleged venue in the indictment but offered no testimony at trial proving 
venue. If no defense objection is raised at or before the close of the 
Government's case, Sandini and Polin instruct that, notwithstanding the 
lack of prosecution testimony, the venue defense is waived. This "give[s] 
the government an opportunity . . . to provide additional proof, if 
possible, to cure an insufficient presentation on venue." Turley, 891 F.2d 
at 61. 
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proof of venue rests entirely on testimony from alleged co- 
conspirators. The Government cites the Fifth Circuit's 
decision in Winship to support the view that testimony from 
admitted co-conspirators can sufficiently support a finding 
of venue as a matter of law. 724 F.2d at 1120. We agree. 
The Government in this case met the minimum 
requirements. 
 
We conclude that the District Court's refusal to instruct 
the jury on venue, based on the facts of this case, was not 
in error despite the defense request for a jury instruction. 
Appellants' general application for acquittal at the close of 
the Government's case claiming that the Government did 
not produce credible evidence to sustain a conviction, 
which would have been timely, failed to alert the 
Government and the Court specifically to the alleged 
impropriety of venue. Moreover, trial testimony failed to put 
venue in issue by creating a genuine issue of material fact 
that required resolution by a jury. Appellants offered no 
objection to the indictment, which clearly alleges a 
conspiracy in the District of New Jersey. Nor did Appellants 
challenge or contradict (by cross-examination or evidence 
introduced during the defense presentation) the venue 
testimony of the indicted co-conspirators offered by the 
Government, which recalled specific overt acts in 
furtherance of the conspiracy in New Jersey.14 In this 
context, the request for a jury instruction on venue was too 
little and too late. 
 
III. Suppression of Evidence 
 
Appellants argue that the District Court erred in denying 
their motions to suppress evidence seized in violation of 
their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The District Court, in its denial of the defense motion for a new 
trial, 
stated that "the evidence . . . as to the presence of venue in the 
District 
of New Jersey is not so overwhelming that the jury couldn't have decided 
otherwise had it been before it." Given the absence of a dispute of 
material fact, "overwhelming" evidence was not necessary for the District 
Court to conclude that the Government's burden was met. The testimony 
of co-conspirators in this case was sufficient to support venue in New 
Jersey. 
 
                                24 
  
searches and seizures. According to Appellants, neither the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement nor the independent source doctrine, both 
relied upon by the District Court in its denial, apply here. 
This Court reviews the District Court's denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
findings and exercises plenary review of the District Court's 
application of the law to those facts. United States v. 
Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
As a threshold matter, Appellants have demonstrated no 
privacy interest in Del Rosario's apartment that would 
permit them to claim the protection guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment as to the items seized from it. Thus 
they lack the capacity to move to suppress the evidence 
seized. Nor does their claim that the seizure of items from 
them personally violates the Fourth Amendment survive 
either a harmless error analysis or the independent source 
doctrine. We conclude that probable cause to secure a 
search warrant existed prior to the officers' entry of Del 
Rosario's apartment15 and that the independent source 
doctrine applies to the items seized. Therefore, we affirm 
the District Court's ruling on the suppression motion. 
 
A. Capacity of Appellants to Claim the Protection of 
       the Fourth Amendment 
 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees 
 
       the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
       houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
       searches and seizures . . . and that no warrants shall 
       issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
       affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
       searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. In its denial of Appellants' motion to 
suppress, the District Court determined that the issue of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Although we have doubts about the District Court's finding that 
exigent circumstances were present to justify the arresting officers' 
decision to enter and secure the premises, we need not address this 
issue in view of our conclusions on the lack of a privacy interest and the 
independent source doctrine. 
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their "standing" was moot in light of the Court's decision on 
the merits that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. 
 
We may affirm the rulings of the District Court for any 
proper reason that appears on the record even where not 
relied on by it. United States v. Miller, 224 F.3d 247, 248 
(3d Cir. 2000). We address the capacity issue here because 
we think it falls squarely within the Supreme Court's 
holding in Minnesota v. Carter, which declared that the 
" `capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the invaded place.' " 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) 
(citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)). Under 
this rule, persons in another's apartment for a short time 
for the business purpose of packaging cocaine had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in that apartment. Thus 
any search which may have occurred did not violate their 
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 91. Although overnight 
guests who are legitimately in a third-party's apartment 
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, Appellants 
do not qualify. See Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99 
(1990). Perez, a resident of Virginia, was booked at the 
Queens Motor Inn. She actually stayed at Batoon's home 
the night before the arrest. She did not stay overnight at 
Del Rosario's apartment. Nor was there any evidence that 
either Alcantera or Batoon resided at or were staying 
overnight at Del Rosario's apartment. 
 
Appellants cite to United States v. Erwin, in which the 
Tenth Circuit ruled, in the context of an automobile stop 
and search, that "[e]ven if defendant lacks standing16 to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In Rakas the Supreme Court opined that "the determination of 
whether the proponent of a motion to suppress is entitled to contest the 
legality of a search and seizure . . . belongs more properly under the 
heading of substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the 
heading of standing. . . ." 439 U.S. at 140. To some this may seem a 
distinction without a difference. See United States v. Felton, 753 F.2d 
256, 259 n.1 (3d Cir. 1985) ("The question necessarily arises whether it 
serves any useful analytical purpose to consider this principle a matter 
of standing, distinct from the merits of a defendant's Fourth Amendment 
claim. We can think of no decided cases of this Court that would have 
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challenge the search of the car, if the initial stop was 
illegal, the seized contraband is subject to exclusion under 
the `fruit of the poison tree' doctrine." 875 F.2d 268, 269 & 
n.2 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). The rationale of Erwin , however, 
does not apply in this context. Instead, we find the 
reasoning of Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Carter 
to be on point. He posed the following hypothetical where 
the entry was illegal: "If respondents here had been visiting 
twenty homes, each for a minute or two, to drop off a bag 
of cocaine and were apprehended by a policeman 
wrongfully present in the nineteenth home, . . . we would 
have said that Rakas compels the rejection of any privacy 
interest respondents might assert." 525 U.S. at 102 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. 
 
In sum, we find no evidence that the Appellants were at 
Del Rosario's apartment for any purpose other than to 
engage in drug-related activities. They therefore have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in Del Rosario's 
apartment to challenge the items seized therefrom under 
the Fourth Amendment and their claims are rejected on 
that basis. See United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 797 
(5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting appellant's challenge of a search 
where he presented no evidence to meet his burden of 
showing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the residence searched). 
 
Alcantera and Batoon also argue, and the Government 
concedes, that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
with respect to the items seized from them personally. From 
Alcantera the Government seized a cell phone with battery 
and a pager; from Batoon a small amount of 
methamphetamine consistent with personal use and a 
pager. However, in light of all of the other evidence properly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
come out differently. . . ."); see also United States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 
438 
(3d Cir. 2000) (using "standing" interchangeably with "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" in discussing the right to challenge the search of 
a car). Nonetheless, "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the 
extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment 
rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined 
concept of standing." Felton, 753 F.2d at 259 n.1. 
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seized from Del Rosario's apartment pursuant to the search 
warrant (see discussion below), any alleged error in the 
admission of this evidence is rendered harmless. See United 
States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 720 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding 
harmless the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress 
fourteen kilograms of cocaine in light of the testimony of 
several witnesses that appellant delivered cocaine for 
distribution, wore a ring associated with a drug-trafficking 
organization, and worked with members of that 
organization). 
 
B. Independent Source Doctrine and Probable Cause 
 
The District Court denied Appellants' motion to suppress 
evidence based in part on the long-standing independent 
source doctrine. That doctrine serves as an exception to the 
exclusionary rule and permits the introduction of illegally 
obtained evidence where the police had an independent 
source for the discovery of the evidence. 
 
       The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of 
       evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so 
       acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it 
       shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean 
       that the facts thus obtained become sacred and 
       inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an 
       independent source they may be proved like any 
       others. 
 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 
(1920); see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 
(1984) (noting that evidence is not to be excluded if police 
had an independent source); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963) (same). The basis for the rule is the 
well-established principle that "evidence is not to be 
excluded if the connection between the illegal police 
conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is `so 
attenuated as to dissipate the taint'." Segura, 468 U.S. at 
797 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 
(1939)). 
 
The facts and legal issues presented in this case are 
similar to those in Segura. There, New York Drug 
Enforcement Task Force agents began surveillance of 
Segura based on information that he and another petitioner 
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were "probably" trafficking in cocaine from their apartment. 
468 U.S. at 799. After observing the delivery of a bulky 
package suspected to be cocaine as per an informant's tip, 
the officers stopped the recipient couple, found them to 
possess cocaine, and placed them under arrest. From this 
couple, the officers learned that they had purchased 
cocaine from Segura. Given that Segura was to call the 
couple at approximately 10:00 p.m. to learn if they had sold 
the cocaine, and that because of the lateness of the hour a 
search warrant could not be obtained, the officers decided 
to "secure" Segura's apartment to prevent destruction of the 
evidence. The officers knocked and entered without the 
consent of the woman who opened the door. They 
conducted a limited security check while others went to 
obtain a search warrant. After nineteen hours, the warrant 
was issued and the search performed. In concluding that 
probable cause existed, although not ruling on the lower 
courts' conclusion that the entry and initial search were not 
justified by exigent circumstances, the Supreme Court held 
that 
 
       the evidence discovered during the subsequent search 
       of the apartment the following day pursuant to the 
       valid search warrant issued wholly on information 
       known to the officers before the entry into the 
       apartment need not have been suppressed as `fruit' of 
       the illegal entry because the warrant and the 
       information on which it was based were unrelated to 
       the entry and therefore constituted an independent 
       source for the evidence . . . . 
 
468 U.S. at 799. 
 
The Supreme Court did not answer directly the question 
presented by this case -- whether probable cause exists if 
it was not clearly established that drugs were in the 
apartment. But it did conclude that probable cause existed 
under the facts of that case, and noted that "[t]he illegality 
of the initial entry . . . has no bearing on . . . whether the 
evidence first discovered during the search of the 
apartment pursuant to a valid warrant issued the day after 
the entry should have been suppressed as `fruit' of the 
illegal entry." Id. at 798. But see United States v. Dice, 200 
F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that violation of knock- 
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and-announce rule during execution of valid search 
warrant warranted suppression of evidence seized in search 
following violation). 
 
Our case law follows the reasoning in Segura. In United 
States v. Herrold, we found that the affidavit for the warrant 
in question contained sufficient probable cause to justify 
the search apart from information the officers learned in 
the initial entry. 962 F.2d 1131 (3d. Cir. 1992). 
 
       In sum, the district court should have asked two 
       questions: (1) whether a neutral justice would have 
       issued the search warrant even if not presented with 
       information that had been obtained during an unlawful 
       search and (2) whether the first search prompted the 
       officers to obtain the search warrant. If the answers to 
       these questions are yes and no respectively, which they 
       are in this case, then the evidence seized during the 
       warranted search, even if already discovered in the 
       original entry, is admissible. Otherwise the police 
       would indeed be in a worse position than they would 
       have been in had they not violated Herrold's Fourth 
       Amendment rights. 
 
Id. at 1144. Our ruling in Herrold harmonized the tainted 
warrant and independent source doctrines. See id. In 
response to the fear that police will have an incentive to 
avoid the warrant requirement, we noted that the 
independent source doctrine 
 
       by its very nature . . . is only applicable where the 
       police have in fact obtained a warrant. In addition, it 
       will not give the police incentive to search first without 
       a warrant, because any information discovered in an 
       unlawful search is useless to the police in a 
       subsequent warrant application. Moreover, our result 
       is dependent upon our conclusion that the police 
       would have obtained the warrant even if Hill had not 
       made his original entry. 
 
Id. This reasoning applies with equal force to the case 
before us. 
 
Thus we turn to whether the tainted information from the 
illegal entry improperly influenced the issuing of the 
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warrant. The Court in United States v. Restrepo , 966 F.2d 
964 (5th Cir. 1992), was presented with a warrantless 
security sweep of a residence and the subsequent search of 
that same residence pursuant to a warrant. It held that "in 
all such cases the district court should consider whether 
the warrant affidavit, once purged of tainted facts and 
conclusions, contains sufficient evidence to constitute 
probable cause for issuance of the warrant." Id. at 970. 
Separate and apart from this determination, the court must 
also determine "whether information gained through the 
illegal search influenced or motivated the officers' decision 
to procure a warrant." Id. at 971. This latter point resulted 
in a remand to the district court. 
 
In our case, Officer Koehler testified during the 
suppression hearing that he had enough probable cause 
based on the information provided from CI-1 and Zoletta to 
convince an Assistant District Attorney to issue him the 
search warrant even if he had never gone into the 
apartment. But during his testimony Koehler acknowledged 
that the affidavit in support of the search warrant included 
things seen in the apartment after an entry not justified by 
exigent circumstances (and therefore tainted). 
 
       Q: You included in that affidavit, did you not, the 
       things you or others had seen in that apartment? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: You included the methamphetamine that was in 
       plain view in the living room? 
 
       A: Right. 
 
       Q: Did you include those things because you felt they 
       were substantial information towards getting the 
       search warrant? 
 
       A: They would just be more helpful, more information. 
 
We nonetheless conclude that probable cause for the 
search warrant existed before the officers decided to enter 
Del Rosario's apartment. See Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 
238 (1983). Similar to the situation in Segura , the officers 
in this case had the apartment under surveillance based on 
tips from confidential informants that Del Rosario was 
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trafficking methamphetamine from his apartment. The 
officers were also informed that a woman named "Linette" 
would be arriving at J.F.K. Airport from the Philippines 
with bulky packages on February 24, 1999. This 
information and Linette's description were corroborated by 
customs agents. While surveilling Del Rosario's apartment 
the next day, officers observed a stream of cars stop outside 
the apartment building, remain for a few minutes, then 
leave. In similar fashion, Zoletta and Abaia then pulled up 
and parked outside the apartment building. After observing 
Zoletta leave the building with a suspicious package and 
drive away with Abaia, the officers trailed and then stopped 
their car. The package contained approximately 200 grams 
of methamphetamine. Zoletta independently confirmed that 
he dealt drugs for Del Rosario for two years in New York 
and New Jersey, that he had received these drugs from Del 
Rosario, and that he was to deliver them on Del Rosario's 
behalf. Zoletta also confirmed the apartment number and 
that additional people remained in the apartment. This 
information was sufficient to establish probable cause to 
seek a search warrant for the apartment irrespective and 
independent of those items discovered within the apartment 
in connection with the tainted police entry. With this 
independent support, a valid search warrant issued, the 
fruit of that search was not tainted, and thus there was no 
violation of Appellants' Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
IV. Expert Testimony 
 
Alcantera claims that the District Court overstepped 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 by permitting the 
Government's expert witness, Ronald Dixon ("Dixon"), to 
testify about facts purported to be within the common 
knowledge of the jurors. Alcantera did not object to the 
District Court's finding that Dixon was qualified to testify 
as an expert in the area of drug-trafficking practices and 
techniques. Instead, he objected on the ground that there 
was no need for the testimony and that it was unfairly 
prejudicial. We review for abuse of discretion the District 
Court's ruling as to the qualifications of Dixon and the 
reliability of his testimony. In re Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B. 
Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d Cir. 1993). We also review for 
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abuse of discretion the Court's refusal to exclude the 
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because any 
unfairly prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its 
probative value. United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 
326-27 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
In a landmark ruling that led in December 2000 to the 
amendment of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharamaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), established the 
trial court as a gatekeeper to exclude unreliable expert 
testimony. Prior to December 2000, Rule 702 read: 
 
       If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
       will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
       or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
       an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
       education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
       or otherwise. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2000). The Rule as amended reads: 
 
       If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
       will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
       or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
       an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
       education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
       or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
       sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product 
       of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness 
       has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
       facts of the case. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2001). 
 
In both versions, the purpose of expert testimony is to 
assist the trier of facts to understand, evaluate, and decide 
complex evidential material. United States v. R. J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 313 (D.N.J. 1976)."The basic 
approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to 
admit them when helpful to the trier of fact." Fed. R. Evid. 
704, advisory committee's note. 
 
Although this Court has not specifically declared the 
modus operandi of drug trafficking as an appropriate or 
reliable field for expert opinion, several courts of appeal 
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have consistently admitted such testimony. See United 
States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling 
expert testimony regarding how drug-traffickers employ 
telephone pagers and public telephones to avoid detection 
by police was properly admitted); United States v. Tapia- 
Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming the 
admission of expert testimony of how drug traffickers 
employed telephone pagers "in order to avoid detection"); 
see also United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582, 589 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (ruling that expert testimony about "tools of the 
trade" of drug traffickers, including "beepers," was properly 
admitted); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 549-51 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (concluding that expert testimony that the use of 
"beepers' by drug traffickers permit them to be anonymous 
and mobile was properly admitted). We join those courts. 
 
Dixon, the Lieutenant of Detectives for the Middlesex 
County, New Jersey Prosecutor's Office, and a thirty-two 
year law enforcement veteran, testified that cellular 
telephones can be used by drug traffickers to frustrate 
police investigations. He explained that police who intercept 
a cellular call will often be ignorant of the location of the 
caller. The police are unable to engage in simultaneous 
wire-tapping and surveillance of the caller, a useful 
investigative technique that often leads police to the 
location of a drug delivery. Dixon also testified that drug 
traffickers employ telephone pagers to transmit numeric 
coded messages. He explained that even if police are able to 
intercept the coded message, they will likely be unable to 
decode it. 
 
We conclude that Dixon's testimony meets the "helpful to 
the trier of fact" threshold established in Rule 702. It is not 
common knowledge among lay persons serving as jurors 
that police are unable simultaneously to wire-tap cellular 
phone calls and keep under surveillance those who make 
them, or that numeric pagers are used by drug traffickers 
to transmit coded messages. Since this testimony was 
helpful and relevant, we likewise conclude that the District 
Court acted within its discretion in refusing to exclude it 
under Rule 403. Therefore, the District Court in this case 
properly exercised its discretion to admit Dixon's testimony 
with respect to drug traffickers' use of cell phones and 
pagers to evade location by police investigators. 
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V. Sufficiency of Evidence of a Single Conspiracy 
 
Appellants Alcantera and Batoon contend that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions of 
conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. First, they 
argue that the proofs at trial do not support the jury's 
verdict as to each of them. Second, they contend that the 
Government failed to prove that they were members of a 
single conspiracy as charged in the indictment. We review 
the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Government, and credit all reasonable inferences that 
support the verdicts. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 
60, 80 (1942); Riddick, 156 F.3d at 508. The verdict will be 
sustained if "any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 
United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The essential elements of conspiracy are "(1) a shared 
`unity of purpose,' (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, 
and (3) an agreement to work together toward the goal." 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citing United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 
(3d Cir. 1988)). "This proof incorporates a demonstration 
that a defendant has `knowledge of the illegal objective 
contemplated by the conspiracy'." Id. (citing Wexler, 838 
F.2d at 91). "The elements of a conspiracy may be proven 
entirely by circumstantial evidence, but each element of the 
offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Wexler, 838 F.2d at 90; see also United States v. Kapp, 781 
F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1024 
(1986); United States v. Samuels, 741 F.2d 570, 573 (3d 
Cir. 1984). 
 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Conspiracy 
 
Alcantera and Batoon argue that the evidence does not 
support their role as co-conspirators. They contend that 
neither had the requisite knowledge of the illegal objective 
of the scheme to distribute methamphetamine such that 
they could form an intent or agreement to join the 
conspiracy. Moreover, they posit that uncorroborated co- 
conspirator testimony is insufficient to support a 
conspiracy conviction. Instead, Batoon insists that he was 
merely in a buyer-seller relationship with Del Rosario that 
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did not rise to the level of a co-conspirator, while Alcantera 
claims that he was at Del Rosario's apartment to receive a 
gift for his newborn son and had no knowledge of the 
presence of illegal drugs. 
 
The Government need not prove that each defendant 
knew all of the conspiracy's details, goals, or other 
participants. See United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 
587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 727 (3d Cir. 1994). 
However, the Government must proffer sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could conclude that the drug transaction 
in which Appellants were involved was "a step in achieving 
the conspiracy's common goal of distributing cocaine for 
profit." Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 593. As Appellants 
point out, "a simple buyer-seller relationship, without any 
prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the sales 
agreement itself, is insufficient to establish that the buyer 
was a member of the seller's conspiracy." United States v. 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing United 
States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 324-25 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 962 (1993)); see also United States v. 
Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808 (7th Cir. 1994). However, in 
Price and Theodoropoulos we reasoned that "even an 
occasional supplier (and by implication an occasional buyer 
for redistribution) can be shown to be a member of the 
conspiracy by evidence, direct or inferential, of knowledge 
that she or he was part of a larger operation." Price, 13 F.3d 
at 728; Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 594. 
 
Among the factors the Court considers to determine a 
defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy are: (1) the length 
of affiliation between the defendant and the conspiracy; (2) 
whether there is an established method of payment; (3) the 
extent to which transactions are standardized; and (4) 
whether there is a demonstrated level of mutual trust. 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199 (citing United States v. Hach, 162 
F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1103 
(1999)). 
 
       While these factors are not necessarily dispositive of 
       the issue, their presence suggests that a defendant has 
       full knowledge of, if not a stake in, a conspiracy: when 
       a defendant drug buyer has repeated, familiar dealings 
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       with members of a conspiracy, that buyer probably 
       comprehends fully the nature of the group with whom 
       he is dealing, is more likely to depend heavily on the 
       conspiracy as the sole source of his drugs, and is more 
       likely to perform drug-related acts for conspiracy 
       members in an effort to maintain his connection to 
       them. 
 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199. 
 
Alcantera and Batoon cite to the Tenth Circuit case of 
United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663 (1992), to support 
their argument that "[m]ere knowledge of an illegal activity, 
even in conjunction with participation in a small part of the 
conspiracy, does not by itself establish that a person has 
joined in the grand conspiracy." Id. at 670. What is needed 
is "a general awareness of both the scope and the objective 
of the enterprise to be regarded as a co-conspirator." Id. 
 
Most damaging to this argument is that seven of the 
eight indicted defendants, including Alcantera and Batoon, 
were present in Del Rosario's apartment on February 25, 
1999, when the N.Y.P.D. officers entered the apartment, 
with nearly 100 grams of crystal methamphetamine in plain 
view. Both were present in the apartment while the 
methamphetamine was distributed to other persons to be 
delivered or sold, and both arguably were providing 
"security" to Del Rosario. Alcantera knew of the plan to 
have Perez smuggle methamphetamine into the United 
States after he met with Daluro, and Batoon met with Perez 
the night she returned from her trip to the Philippines. 
 
Contrary to the claim that he was merely in a buyer- 
seller arrangement with Del Rosario, Alcantera admitted to 
Uy that he was one of Del Rosario's methamphetamine 
distributors. Prior to the arrest, Alcantera obtained twenty 
grams of methamphetamine from Daluro in New Jersey 
expressly for delivery to Del Rosario. Moreover, after 
Alcantera testified that he never called Del Rosario on the 
telephone, the Government confronted him with telephone 
records that established that he made and received 
numerous phone calls to and from Del Rosario around the 
time that the shipment of methamphetamine was due in 
from the Philippines. Like Alcantera, Batoon received 
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distribution amounts of methamphetamine from Del 
Rosario several times, once on credit. This evidence is 
sufficient to prove their general awareness of the scope and 
objective of the conspiracy. 
 
Alcantera and Batoon also argue that the uncorroborated 
testimony of their alleged co-conspirators Almiranez, 
Daluro, Zoletta and Uy is not sufficient to sustain their 
convictions, citing to United States v. Sturman , 49 F.3d 
1275 (7th Cir. 1995). However, the Sturman Court left 
"open the question of whether co-conspirator testimony 
alone can support a conspiracy conviction." Id. at 1281 
(citing United States v. Martinez de Ortiz, 907 F.2d 629, 632 
(7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 1029 
(1991)). The Seventh Circuit followed Sturman  with its 
opinion in United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th 
Cir. 1995), wherein it held that "[w]e will uphold a 
conviction based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of 
an accomplice unless his testimony is incredible as a 
matter of law." Id. at 1148-49. 
 
In the context of accomplice testimony, we rejected in 
United States v. DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1971), 
the very argument Alcantera and Batoon proffer."We follow 
the Supreme Court in holding that uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony may constitutionally provide the 
exclusive basis for a criminal conviction." Id. at 1060 (citing 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)). See also 
Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1255 (3d Cir. 1980). 
This is particularly the case where the defense has ample 
opportunity to cross-examine the Government's witnesses, 
as Alcantera and Batoon had. See United States v. 
Enriquez, 201 F.3d 1072, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[Defense] 
counsel cross-examined each of the co-conspirators with 
whom the government had made plea agreements . . . and 
attempted to expose their potential for bias and self- 
interest. Furthermore, the jury was specifically instructed 
as to its role in weighing witnesses' testimony and 
credibility. The jury's decision to credit the testimony of 
those witnesses was within its province, and we will uphold 
the conviction if substantial evidence supports it."). 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Government, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have 
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found Alcantera and Batoon guilty of conspiracy to possess 
with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Alcantera's and 
Batoon's presence at the ringleader's apartment when the 
drug shipment was being doled out, their awareness of and 
involvement with Del Rosario and Perez around the time of 
the delivery, as well as repeated dealings with Del Rosario 
prior to the arrest, are sufficient facts from which a 
reasonable jury can infer a general awareness of the scope 
of the illegal objective. That some of this evidence was 
provided by alleged co-conspirator testimony does not 
render the entire evidence insufficient to support the 
convictions of Alcantera and Batoon. The Government's 
evidence addresses each of the factors discussed in Gibbs, 
establishing Alcantera's and Batoon's knowledge of the 
broader conspiracy and contradicting a mere buyer-seller 
arrangement.17 
 
B. Variance between single conspiracy as charged and 
       the proof at trial 
 
Alcantera and Batoon also claim that the single 
conspiracy charged in the indictment impermissibly varied 
from the evidence at trial which proved, at most, that two 
separate conspiracies existed. "A defendant alleging a 
variance between a single conspiracy charged in an 
indictment and the proof presented at trial must 
demonstrate, first, that there was such a variance and, 
second, that the variance prejudiced one of his substantial 
rights." United States v. Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1337 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 
(3d Cir. 1989)). "Where a single conspiracy is alleged in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The concern of the Tenth Circuit in Evans , echoed by Chief Judge 
Becker in footnote 3 in Gibbs -- that a small time drug dealer could be 
held responsible for all of the drugs originated by the cartel for 
sentencing purposes -- is not implicated in this case. We conclude that 
Alcantera and Batoon had sufficient knowledge of and a stake in the 
larger conspiracy to justify a jury finding them to be co-conspirators. 
See 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199 n.3; Evans, 970 F.2d at 670. Moreover, we note 
that the District Court in this case instructed the jury that "[a] buyer- 
seller relationship alone is insufficient to prove a conspiracy to 
distribute 
or a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute an illegal drug. This 
is the case even when the buyer intends to resell the purchased 
narcotics." 
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indictment, there is a variance if the evidence at trial proves 
only the existence of multiple conspiracies." Kelly, 892 F.2d 
at 258 (citing United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 200 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986)). The issue of 
whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies exist is 
a fact question to be decided by a jury. United States v. 
Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 572 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Smith, 789 
F.2d at 200). We will sustain the jury's verdict if there is 
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the Government, to support a finding of a single conspiracy. 
Smith, 789 F.2d at 200. 
 
To provide notice of the charges against a defendant and 
to protect against double jeopardy, the indictment must 
adequately set forth the crime alleged. See Gaither v. United 
States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Where 
evidence at trial proves facts different than those alleged in 
the indictment, an impermissible variance may exist. Smith, 
789 F.2d at 200. For example, when a single conspiracy is 
charged in the indictment and the evidence at trial proves 
only the existence of multiple, unrelated conspiracies, there 
is a variance. See Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750 
(1946); Kelly, 892 F.2d at 258; United States v. Boyd, 595 
F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 
Multiple conspiracies are "separate networks operating 
independently of each other." United States v. Barr, 963 
F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1992). "However, a finding of a 
master conspiracy with sub-schemes does not constitute a 
finding of multiple, unrelated conspiracies and, therefore, 
would not create an impermissible variance." Smith, 789 
F.2d at 200. Thus, the relatedness of the activities of the 
co-conspirators in support of the overall illegal scheme can 
defeat a claim of multiple conspiracies. 
 
Variances "are examined on a case-by-case basis and 
constitute reversible error only if the defendant was 
prejudiced." Smith, 789 F.2d at 200 (citing United States v. 
Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1121 (3d Cir. 1985)); United States 
v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 743 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 832 (1974)). This "variance doctrine" protects a 
defendant from being tried "en masse for the 
conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses committed 
by others." United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1116 
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(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110 (1992) (quoting 
Kelly, 892 F.2d at 258). "The doctrine is intended to prevent 
a situation in which the jury might `be unable to separate 
offenders and offenses and easily could ... transfer[ ] the 
guilt from one alleged co-schemer to another.' " Barr, 963 
F.2d at 648 (quoting United States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31, 
38 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 
Several courts have focused on the interdependency of 
the sub-schemes in support of the overall conspiracy. See, 
e.g., Evans, 970 F.2d at 670 ("the defendant's actions must 
`facilitate the endeavors of other alleged co-conspirators or 
facilitate the venture as a whole' ") (citing United States v. 
Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 743 (10th Cir. 1991)); United States v. 
Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 843 (1990); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 
1217 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972). 
Interdependency, however, is merely "evidence of an 
agreement." United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1352 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909 (1977). It is not an 
element of the offense. United States v. DiPasquale, 740 
F.2d 1282, 1291 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. 
Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 957 n.12 (3d Cir. 1979)). 
 
In support of their argument, Alcantera and Batoon cite 
to a snippet from the uncorroborated co-conspirator 
testimony of Almiranez. 
 
       Q.: (Direct examination of Almiranez by Government) 
       When individuals came over to [Del Rosario's] 
       apartment, what happened? 
 
       A.: Oh, they get their drugs too. Everybody that went 
       there, they get their own drugs. 
 
       * * * * 
 
       Q.: Were there any discussions in [Del Rosario's] 
       apartment between you and the other individuals in 
       the apartment regarding the distribution of crystal 
       meth? 
 
       A.: No, we don't -- we don't discuss those distribution 
       . . . we don't discuss distribution, none. 
 
       Q.: Why not, why don't you discuss it? 
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       A.: Because they distribute in New York. I do in 
       Jersey. It's different areas. 
 
This testimony, Alcantera and Batoon contend, disproves 
their knowledge of and interdependency with the"New 
Jersey" conspiracy. Consequently, they argue, the 
Government's allegation and the jury's finding that the two 
were part of single conspiracy must fail. 
 
We disagree. "To establish a single conspiracy, the 
prosecutor need not prove that each defendant knew all the 
details, goals or other participants." United States v. 
Padilla, 982 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1992). "The prosecution 
must, however, demonstrate that a defendant, charging 
variance, knew that he was part of a larger drug operation." 
Quintero, 38 F.3d at 1337 (citing Padilla , 982 F.2d at 114). 
As we noted above in Part V.A., the Government met this 
burden of proof. 
 
Moreover, we find that there is sufficient evidence from 
which a reasonable jury can find interdependency among 
the co-conspirators. The Government demonstrated that 
methamphetamine is difficult to prepare, find, and 
purchase on the streets. Alcantera and Batoon depended on 
a scheme involving Del Rosario, Perez and the shipment 
from the Philippines to possess and distribute the illegal 
drug. In turn, Del Rosario depended on the two to 
distribute the methamphetamine once it came in. In 
addition, because Alcantera and Batoon stayed with Del 
Rosario throughout the morning and afternoon of the 
arrest, the jury could have logically concluded that the two 
provided security to Del Rosario as the drugs were 
distributed. See United States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 312- 
13 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding a single conspiracy to be proven 
when there is "evidence of a large general scheme, and of 
aid given by some conspirators to others in aid of that 
scheme") (citing Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1216). 
 
The concern with a "spillover of evidence" is unfounded in 
this case. The Government presented evidence that directly 
implicated both Alcantera and Batoon in the conspiracy. 
The majority of the remaining evidence, including the 
testimony of Zoletta about his own and Perez's role in the 
conspiracy, was relevant to both Alcantera and Batoon 
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regardless whether there was a single or multiple 
conspiracies. 
 
Moreover, the District Court's jury instructions in this 
case dispel the concerns of prejudice to Alcantera and 
Batoon. With respect to the finding of a single conspiracy, 
the Court instructed the jury to acquit if the evidence 
established "separate or independent conspiracies[that] 
would be at variance with that charged," and that"proof of 
a different conspiracy, that is, one without that specific 
objective [alleged in the indictment], would not be proof of 
the conspiracy charged in the indictment and would require 
a verdict of not guilty." With respect to individualized 
findings of innocence or guilt, the District Court instructed 
the jury to give "separate consideration to and render a 
separate verdict as to each defendant based solely on the 
evidence pertaining to that defendant," and to"exercise 
great care to evaluate the evidence or lack of evidence 
against each defendant individually . . . without regard as 
to what your decision as to any other defendant might be." 
 
In sum, we find that Alcantera and Batoon have failed to 
demonstrate (1) a variance between the single conspiracy as 
charged in the indictment and the evidence offered at trial 
to prove that conspiracy and, (2) regardless of the alleged 
variance, any prejudice to them as a result of the 
Government's proof at trial. 
 
VI. Refusal to Immunize Del Rosario and Brady 
Violation 
 
Appellants Perez and Batoon claim that the District Court 
erroneously refused to immunize Del Rosario so that he 
could testify as a defense witness at trial. Based on the 
same set of facts, Perez and Batoon also claim that the 
Government failed to reveal exculpatory evidence to the 
defense with respect to Del Rosario's statements to 
investigators, thereby warranting a new trial. We review the 
District Court's refusal to immunize Del Rosario for abuse 
of discretion. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 
1213-14 (3d Cir. 1978). The District Court's factual findings 
regarding the likely effect of undisclosed information are 
reviewed only for clear error. United States v. Pelullo, 173 
F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Immediately following his arrest and after waiving his 
Miranda rights, Del Rosario told investigators that Perez 
had smuggled multiple kilograms of methamphetamine into 
the United States from the Philippines and delivered them 
to Del Rosario. Months later, Del Rosario changed his story 
and told investigators that Zoletta, not Perez, had delivered 
the drugs to Del Rosario. Perez sought to present Del 
Rosario as a defense witness and question him about the 
second statement. The District Court had Del Rosario and 
his attorney appear before it to determine if he would 
testify. Del Rosario, outside the presence of the jury, 
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination and refused to answer any questions. Perez 
then asked the District Court to confer immunity on Del 
Rosario so that he could be compelled to testify as a 
defense witness, in the hope that he would testify in 
accordance with his second statement and exculpate Perez. 
The Government opposed the request. 
 
We have prescribed a five-factor analysis when assessing 
a request to grant judicial use immunity18  to a witness who 
refuses to testify: (1) the immunity is properly sought in the 
District Court; (2) the witness is available to testify; (3) the 
proffered testimony is clearly exculpatory; (4) the proffered 
testimony is essential to the defense; and (5) there is no 
strong governmental interest against the immunity. See 
United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d 
Cir. 1980). The District Court concluded that, because any 
exculpatory testimony that Del Rosario might offer on 
behalf of Perez would be severely impeached by his prior 
inculpatory statement against her, Perez could not 
establish that the proffered testimony was "clearly 
exculpatory" or "essential to her defense." 
 
A similar analysis applies to the alleged Brady  violation. 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Use immunity, conferred by the judge on a witness who refuses to 
testify, prohibits a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits from 
being 
used in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the 
witness except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or 
otherwise failing to comply with the order. See  18 U.S.C. SS 6001-6005. 
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suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused warrants a new trial where "the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. 
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had it been disclosed, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. Stickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 
281 (1999); see also Holman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 181 
(3d Cir. 1998) (evidence is material if it "could reasonably 
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as 
to undermine confidence in the verdict"); United States v. 
Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 972 (3d Cir. 1991) (evidence is 
favorable if "it may make a difference between conviction 
and acquittal"). 
 
Perez and Batoon argued below that the prosecution 
violated Brady by failing to disclose a statement by Del 
Rosario that Zoletta, not Perez, had delivered the drugs to 
Del Rosario. The District Court concluded that the 
Government had violated a duty under Brady to disclose 
the identity of Zoletta as a potential alternative source for 
the drugs to the defense for two reasons: first, because the 
evidence was "substantially exculpatory," and second, 
because it was untimely offered after the immunity hearing. 
However, the District Court concluded that a new trial was 
not warranted because there was no reasonable probability 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different 
if Del Rosario's statement had been disclosed.19 In other 
words, the allegedly exculpatory evidence was neither 
"essential to the defense" under the immunity test nor 
"material" under the Brady test. 
 
On appeal, Perez and Batoon offer a litany of reasons 
why the District Court should have granted a new trial. 
First, Perez argues that the suppressed evidence was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Here, the District Court slightly misstated the law because "strictly 
speaking, there is never a real `Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure 
was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed 
evidence would have produced a different verdict." Stickler, 527 U.S. at 
281. The Government does not violate Brady unless the undisclosed 
evidence is found to be material. Because the District Court ruled that 
the evidence was not material to Perez's defense, no Brady violation 
occurred. 
 
                                45 
  
material because the defense was prevented from using Del 
Rosario's statement to contradict the prosecution's theory 
of the case. She contends that Del Rosario's statement that 
Zoletta had delivered drugs to his apartment on the night 
before the raid would have been credible because (1) it was 
corroborated by Zoletta's own admission before the jury, 
and (2) he had nothing to gain by contradicting the 
prosecution's theory of the case at a time when he had 
hopes for entering into a cooperating plea agreement. 
However, the District Court addressed this argument and 
concluded that Del Rosario's testimony, even if credible, 
would not have made a difference in the trial because, while 
it may come in to impeach Zoletta, it could not come in for 
substantive consideration by the jury because it was 
inadmissible hearsay -- an out-of-court statement by 
Zoletta offered by Perez to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
 
This position is supported in cases cited by the 
Government. See Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 567 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (finding undisclosed evidence was not material 
where "[e]ach item of evidence was in fact inadmissible at 
trial" and the defendant "presents only speculation that he 
would have uncovered any admissible evidence from these 
three hearsay leads"); United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 
799, 818 (4th Cir. 1998) (concluding that undisclosed 
statements by legislators to FBI agents were not material in 
prosecution of legislators for campaign finance violations in 
part because they were inadmissible hearsay); see also 
Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5 (1995) (per curiam) 
(finding failure to disclose that witness had failed polygraph 
test did not deprive respondent of material evidence 
because polygraph results would have been inadmissible at 
trial, even for impeachment purposes). 
 
The Government responds that the value of Del Rosario's 
later statement inculpating Zoletta (and thereby exculpating 
Perez) would have been undercut by the fact that Del 
Rosario's initial statement regarding Perez was fully and 
powerfully corroborated by Perez's passport and travel 
itinerary as well as the testimony of Uy and Almiranez. Del 
Rosario's statement is therefore neither essential to Perez's 
defense nor material evidence warranting a new trial. We 
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agree. See United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 795 
(3d Cir. 1987) (finding no Brady violation for failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence that was not credible); see 
also Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding undisclosed statement that someone other than 
the defendant possessed the murder weapon three weeks 
after the murder was not material exculpatory evidence "[i]n 
light of this overwhelming evidence that Buehl had the 
[murder weapon] at the time of the killings and that he was 
the murderer"); Landano v. Rafferty, 856 F.2d 569, 572 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (concluding that evidence tending to exculpate 
defendant, Landano, in robbery and murder was not 
material because "any such inference would have been 
directly at odds with other, stronger evidence implicating 
Landano in the crime"). 
 
Perez and Batoon also argue that the suppressed 
evidence was material because the defense was prevented 
from cross-examining Zoletta more vigorously to develop 
further evidence exculpating Perez. The District Court 
concluded that heightened cross-examination of Zoletta 
that might have occurred if the defense had known of Del 
Rosario's statement would not have induced Zoletta to 
admit before the jury that he had been the one to deliver 
the drugs to Del Rosario's apartment. 
 
Perez and Batoon further argue that the suppressed 
evidence was material because it might have persuaded the 
District Court to grant Del Rosario immunity so that he 
could testify for the defense at trial. The District Court, 
reconsidering its denial of immunity for Zoletta on 
defendants' motions for a new trial, conceded that"had the 
identity of Mr. Zoletta as a potential specific alternative 
source of the drugs been revealed prior to that immunity 
hearing his name would certainly have been mentioned and 
the court would have been asked to evaluate [Del Rosario's] 
immunity request in that light." However, the District Court 
ultimately concluded that its ruling on use immunity would 
not have changed even if the Government had properly 
disclosed Del Rosario's statement implicating Zoletta rather 
than Perez. The Court explained that Del Rosario's 
statement would not have been "clearly exculpatory 
testimony" warranting a grant of immunity because its 
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value would have been undercut by Del Rosario's prior 
inconsistent statement implicating Perez. 
 
In this light, the District Court properly came to the 
conclusion that a retrial was not warranted because there 
was no reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence 
would have changed the outcome of the original proceeding. 
The District Court was best situated to observe Zoletta's 
demeanor and attitude at trial. See Messerlian , 832 F.2d at 
795 (concluding that, when considering whether witness's 
testimony is exculpatory evidence for purposes of possible 
Brady violation, the District Court "was best situated to 
observe the demeanor of the two witnesses and to assess 
the consistency of their testimony"). 
 
In addition, we find no merit to Perez and Batoon's 
arguments that they were prejudiced at sentencing by the 
suppressed statement. It had been disclosed by the time of 
sentencing, and the defense lawyer conceded at the 
sentencing hearing that he "did not have grounds to 
dispute" the Probation Office's calculation of the applicable 
drug amount based upon the defendants' participation in 
the conspiracy. 
 
With respect to Del Rosario's testimony, we conclude that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
declined to immunize Del Rosario. In light of the evidence, 
we find reasonable the District Court's determination that 
the disclosure of Del Rosario's statement implicating Zoletta 
would not have changed the decision to deny Del Rosario 
use immunity. See United States v. Steele, 685 F.2d 793 
808 (3d Cir. 1982) (judicial immunity properly denied where 
proposed immunized testimony would not have been 
"clearly exculpatory"); United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 
950, 965 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); see also United States v. 
Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 251 n.8 (3d Cir. 1983) (judicial 
immunity properly denied where "the exculpatory nature of 




Finally, Alcantera's and Batoon's challenge of their 
sentences--specifically that the District Court erred (1) in 
denying a two level minor role reduction pursuant to the 
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 3B1.2 20 and (2) in 
attributing more than between one and three kilograms of 
methamphetamine to Batoon--is without merit. Nor does 
Alcantera's sentence violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000). 
 
A. Minor Role Reduction 
 
In United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 
1997), we held that we must sustain the District Court's 
factual findings as to a S 3B1.2 minimal or minor role 
adjustment unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See 
id. ("We review under a clearly erroneous standard the 
district court's factual determinations, such as whether a 
defendant receives a reduced or increased offense level 
based on his role in the offense."); United States v. Carr, 25 
F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Bierley, 
922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. 
Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that role in the offense is a factual determination, albeit 
complex; a district court's decision not to apply an 
adjustment based on such a determination is reversed only 
for clear error)). A decision is clearly erroneous if the 
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction 
based on all the evidence that the trial court made a 
mistake. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 
U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 
No. 2571, 1981 WL 26711, at *6 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 1981). 
 
Here, we cannot say that the District Court committed 
clear error in finding that Alcantera and Batoon were not 
entitled to a minor role reduction. The District Court 
sentenced Alcantera to 190 months imprisonment. In doing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Section 3B1.2 states: 
 
       Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense 
       level as follows: 
 
       (a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal 
       activity, decrease by 4 levels. 
 
       (b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal 
       activity, decrease by 2 levels. 
 
       In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels. 
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so, the Court denied his motion for a minor role downward 
departure of two points. It reasoned as follows: 
 
       [T]he definition of a minor participant under Section 
       3B1.2 is any participant who is less culpable than 
       most other participants, whose role could not be 
       described as minimal. . . . [I]f we take a look at the 
       others involved here, Batoon, Almiranez, Zoletta, Del 
       Rosario, this Court is not in a position to say it has 
       been established that Mr. Alcantera is to be considered 
       less culpable than those other participants. . . . Their 
       role, although different perhaps than Perez or Del 
       Rosario, in this Court's view, was significantly 
       important, certainly they are as culpable as each other 
       in performing those similar functions without which 
       the distribution and the conspiracy could not have 
       succeeded. So that it's the Court's determination that 
       Mr. Alcantera is not entitled to a minor role here .. . 
 
With respect to Batoon, the District Court denied his 
motion for a minimal or minor role downward departure of 
three points, sentencing him to 152 months imprisonment. 
The Court stated: 
 
       [N]ow to the question of . . . Section 3B1.2 .. . as to 
       whether Mr. Batoon is entitled to a mitigating role. He 
       asks the Court to consider even his role as minimal 
       participant and then minor participant, someone 
       entitled to a three level reduction if his conduct would 
       be classified between those two roles. . . [F]or the 
       purpose of Section 3B1.2, a minor participant means 
       any participant less culpable than most other 
       participants but whose role should not be discarded as 
       minimal. . . . [T]his Court is not in a position to say 
       that Mr. Batoon is a person who is less culpable than 
       most other participants. . . . We have a number of 
       people identified and the Court is not prepared to say 
       that Mr. Batoon's role could be considered modest 
       . . . . Mr. Batoon . . . [was] on the scene on the 
       premises for at least a significant period of time on the 
       day in question while couriers or purchasers, as the 
       case may be, were coming and going for the purposes 
       of receiving varying amounts of meth from Mr. Del 
       Rosario. [T]he Court therefore finds . . . Mr. Batoon . . . 
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       not so less culpable than any others as to be 
       determined to be less culpable than most other 
       participants . . . . So that, based on that determination 
       as well, the Court declines to apply a minimal or even 
       a minor role adjustment. 
 
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the 
District Court's findings as to Alcantera's and Batoon's 
roles in the conspiracy were not clearly erroneous. The 
Court analyzed their respective participation against that of 
each co-defendant and found that each was no less 
culpable than any other, and therefore did not qualify for 
the departure. 
 
B. Quantity Attributable to Batoon 
 
Batoon also argues that the Government failed to prove 
that he was responsible for any of the drugs, let alone the 
one to three kilograms found by the District Court to be the 
quantity seized from Del Rosario's apartment. We review for 
clear error the District Court's findings of fact regarding the 
relevant quantities of drugs attributable to the defendant. 
United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 214 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Calculation of the applicable drug amount must be 
determined on the basis of Batoon's relevant conduct. See 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual SS 1B1.3, 2D1.1. 
Relevant conduct includes: 
 
       (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
       abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
       procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and 
 
       (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
       activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or 
       enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert 
       with others, whether or not charged as a 
       conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and 
       omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly 
       undertaken criminal activity, 
 
       that occurred during the commission of the offense of 
       conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the 
       course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility 
       for that offense . . . . 
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Id. S 1B1.3(a)(1). The application notes help clarify the 
definition of relevant conduct. Application note 2 states in 
part: 
 
       In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
       subsection (a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is 
       accountable for the conduct (acts and omissions) of 
       others that was both: 
 
        (i) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal 
       activity; and 
 
        (ii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that 
       criminal activity. 
 
       . . . 
 
       In determining the scope of the criminal activity that 
       the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake 
       (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives 
       embraced by the defendant's agreement), the court may 
       consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement 
       fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and 
       others. 
 
       . . . 
 
       With respect to offenses involving contraband 
       (including controlled substances), the defendant is 
       accountable for all quantities of contraband with which 
       he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly 
       undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable 
       quantities of contraband that were within the scope of 
       the criminal activity that he jointly undertook. 
 
Id. S 1B1.3, cmt. n.2. 
 
Batoon contends that he should not be responsible for 
the amount of drugs found in Del Rosario's apartment 
because he did not "agree[ ] to jointly undertake" in the 
drug distribution scheme. However, the District Court 
found Batoon responsible for the full amount of drugs 
pursuant to S1B1.3(a)(1)(A) because Batoon personally 
"aided and abetted" the distribution of methamphetamine 
by providing security to Del Rosario. Application note 2 
explains that a finding of joint undertaking under 
subsection (a)(1)(B) is not necessary where the defendant 
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personally aids or abets a crime under (a)(1)(A). Id. S 1B1.3, 
cmt. n.2. 
 
In response, Batoon replies that he did not "actually 
agree[ ] to provide such security," and thus, he should not 
be found responsible under this provision. However, 
Batoon's argument fails to recognize that the agreement 
can be explicit or an "implicit agreement fairly inferred from 
the conduct of the defendant and others." U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual S1B1.3, cmt. n.2. Here, from Batoon's 
conduct (specifically his remaining in Del Rosario's 
apartment for a significant amount of time while several 
others came and went), the District Court found an implied 
agreement between Del Rosario and Batoon to provide 
security. 
 
       I believe it's also a fair inference for the Court to 
       conclude that Mr. Del Rosario did not want to be alone 
       or virtually alone in the apartment with supplies of 
       methamphetamine of this kind while being vested with 
       any number of persons who would be looking for 
       drugs. . . . [T]he presence of confidants in Mr. Del 
       Rosario, such as, Mr. Batoon, . . . certainly had the 
       effect of providing some level of security to Mr. Del 
       Rosario . . . . 
 
Furthermore, Batoon can be found responsible for the 
full amount of drugs pursuant to S1B1.3(a)(1)(B) because 
the full amount of drugs present in the apartment and 
Batoon's conduct were "(i) in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity; and (ii) reasonably foreseeable 
in connection with that criminal activity." U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual S 1B1.3, cmt. n.2. Batoon's conduct was 
in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity 
because, as already noted and among other things, 
evidence exists that he provided security for Del Rosario 
while distributing the drugs. The full amount was 
reasonably foreseeable to Batoon because he was in the 
apartment for an extended period of time while the drugs 
were being distributed, and there was information 
circulating that a large shipment had arrived from the 
Philippines. 
 
With the above in mind, it cannot be said that the 
District Court committed clear error in attributing the 
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entire amount of the drugs to Batoon as he "is accountable 
for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly 
involved and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband 
that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he 
jointly undertook." Id.; see also Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 214-15 
(holding that appellant who acted as enforcer was 
responsible at sentencing for all of the drugs distributed 




Although not claimed in the District Court, Alcantera, in 
a pro se addendum to his counseled brief, claims before us 
that the District Court erred by calculating the amount of 
methamphetamine attributable to him at sentencing by a 
preponderance of the evidence, rather than requiring the 
amount to be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. He argues that this violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000). Because he did not raise this claim in 
the District Court, our Court reviews only for plain error. 
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); United 
States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); 
United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 234-35 & n.12 (3d 
Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Swatzie , 228 F.3d 
1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 
The Supreme Court in Apprendi held that,"[o]ther than 
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Here, the 
District Court's finding of the applicable drug amount did 
not increase the penalty for the crime beyond the statutory 
maximum. Alcantera was sentenced to 190 months, far less 
than the lowest statutory maximum for violations of 21 
U.S.C. S 846, which is 20 years. See 21 U.S.C. 
SS 841(b)(1)(C), 846. Thus, there is no error, let alone plain 
error, under Apprendi. See United States v. Williams, 235 
F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000) (ruling that "Apprendi is not 
applicable to [appellant's] sentence, because the sentence 
actually imposed . . . was well under the original statutory 
maximum of 20 years."); In re Edmonds, No. 00-3075, 2000 
WL 1683479, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12 2000) (per curiam) 
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(concluding that because defendant did not exceed the 





For the reasons stated above, we affirm the convictions 
and sentences of Appellants Perez, Alcantera and Batoon. 
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